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Abstract: Human rights abuses resulting from Canadian mining op-
erations in Latin America have increasingly surfaced, and new, bold paths 
of accountability are being forged. However, this is not the end. Few reg-
ulations exist for mine closure, a process that itself can leave devastation 
in the communities affected. In this Comment, I ground my analysis in 
the facts and history of the Marlin Mine in western Guatemala. I set forth 
the structural barriers to justice posed by multinational corporations with 
operations abroad, and discuss two possible routes for accountability in 
relation to mine closure. First, within the universal human rights system, 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
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offers some hope through the expansion of its extraterritorial application, 
particularly in relation to third parties. Second, I explore possibilities 
within the Inter-American human rights system, including progress in 
terms of environmental rights and the extraterritorial application of hu-
man rights. I conclude with a reflection on the appropriateness of human 
rights law as a mechanism of accountability for these abuses. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Open pit mining, as the name suggests, can be environmentally dev-
astating. Its name in Spanish, however, tells the story from a different 
perspective: la minería a cielo abierto, which loosely translates to “open 
sky mining.”1 In this paper, I trace new possibilities within international 
human rights law for holding multinational corporations (MNCs) ac-
countable for environmental damage abroad, a goal which has been elu-
sive within the human rights regime.2 To be clear, I do not argue that the 
available human rights protection mechanisms are sufficient – an open 
pit mine is an open pit mine whether it faces the stars or not. Rather, I 
outline developments that, when strung together, indicate an opening for 
the kind of accountability that has thus far been nearly impossible to se-
cure. Whether these developments will actually lead to accountability, 
despite the structural barriers in place preventing this kind of justice, re-
mains an open question.  
To remove this analysis from the realm of the abstract, I anchor my 
discussion in the closure of the Marlin Mine in Guatemala. The Marlin 
Mine was a gold mine operated by a wholly-owned subsidiary of Gold-
corp Inc., a Canadian company, which uses a combination of open pit and 
underground mining techniques.3 It closed in 2017 and left a legacy of 
 
* J.D., UCLA School of Law. My gratitude to Charis Kamphuis for the unwavering encouragement, 
and all my Justice and Corporate Accountability Project colleagues for their valuable feedback. 
Sincere thanks to the editors of Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 
for providing thoughtful edits and support. 
 1. Similarly, rather than lie on your back, in Spanish you lie boca arriba, or mouth up. In 
both instances you find yourself in a vulnerable position; in the second, however, you might have 
something to say about it. 
 2. See, e.g., Anna Grear & Burns H. Weston, The Betrayal of Human Rights and the Urgency 
of Universal Corporate Accountability: Reflections on a Post-Kiobel Lawscape, 15 HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 21, 25-26, 32 (2015). 
 3. ON COMMON GROUND CONSULTANTS INC., HUMAN RIGHTS ASSESSMENT OF 
GOLDCORP’S MARLIN MINE 4, 9 (2010), https://www.goldcorpoutofguatemala.files.wordpress
.com/2010/07/ocg_hra_exec_summary.pdf. 
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ongoing environmental and social damage.4 Since human rights law fo-
cuses, naturally, on humans, my analysis folds environmental damage 
into the framework of economic, social, and cultural rights.5 
In Part II, I set forth the structural barriers to justice posed by MNCs 
with operations abroad. In Part III, I review the facts and history of the 
Marlin Mine, specifically focusing on the interconnectedness of environ-
mental, economic, social, and cultural harms related to closure. With this 
foundation, in Part IV I discuss the possibilities for accountability within 
a universal human rights system through the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the expansion of 
its extraterritorial application, particularly in relation to third parties. Part 
V explores possibilities within the Inter-American human rights system, 
including progress in terms of environmental rights and the extraterrito-
rial application of human rights. I conclude with a reflection on the ap-
propriateness of human rights law as an accountability mechanism for 
these abuses.  
II.  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
It is notoriously difficult to hold MNCs accountable for abuses com-
mitted outside their country of origin. Although this paper will not focus 
on these structural barriers, it is important to describe this underlying 
framework in order to assess whether certain legal developments have the 
capacity to promote justice and disrupt these structural barriers to ac-
countability.  
 
 4. BUS. FOR SOC. RESP., MARLIN MINE AT CLOSURE: A REVIEW OF GOLDCORP 
COMMITMENTS TO THE 2010 HUMAN RIGHTS ASSESSMENT 84 (2017); Frente de Defensa San Mi-
guelense (FREDEMI, The Front in Defense of San Miguel Ixtahuacán), Specific Instance Com-
plaint Submitted to the Canadian National Contact Point Pursuant to the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises Concerning: The Operations of Goldcorp Inc. at the Marlin Mine in the 
Indigenous Community of San Miguel Ixtahuacán, Guatemala, CTR. FOR INT’L ENV’T L. 10-12 
(Dec. 9, 2009), https://www.ciel.org/Publications/FREDEMI_SpecificInstanceComplaint_
December%202009.pdf (outlining damage including, among others, skin abnormalities in children, 
contaminated water, dried up springs, broken homes, bridges and roads, and dead cattle). Gold-
corp’s understanding of the closure was, predictably, different: “While Goldcorp and Montana 
have, in general, made great strides in implementing the recommendations proposed by OCG [ON 
COMMON GROUND CONSULTANTS INC., supra note 3], gaps remain. Some cannot be fulfilled, 
given that the mine’s closure is underway and opportunities for action are now limited.” 
 5. This relationship is particularly important in the context of mine closure. UYANGA 
GANKHUYAG & FABRICE GREGOIRE, MANAGING MINING FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: A 
SOURCEBOOK 17 (Andy Quan ed., 2018) (“Since mining often takes place in peripheral, less devel-
oped regions and locations, the socio-economic impact of mine closure can heavily impact local 
communities”); Vlado Vivoda, Deanna Kemp & John Owen, Regulating the Social Aspects of Mine 
Closure in Three Australian States, 37 J. ENERGY & NAT. RES. L. 2-3 (2019). 
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The development of the modern corporation in the U.S. happened, 
not coincidentally, alongside the expansion of the public sphere after the 
Civil War.6 That is, just as the enslavement of Black people came to a 
legal end, the private sphere expanded in order to continue to exclude 
newly freed Black communities from means of accumulating capital.7 
This interpretation aligns with contemporary understandings of the mo-
ment; for example, W.E.B. Du Bois’ description of the post-Civil War 
amendments period as “a brief moment in the sun” for Black Americans 
who “then moved back again toward slavery”.8 At the same time, mech-
anisms were being developed to undo paths for inclusion, such as the civil 
rights cases’ gutting of the Civil War amendments.9 In Canada, a similar 
movement toward the consolidation of corporate power was taking 
place.10 Considering that many white Canadians feared an influx of Black 
Americans into Canada as a result of the Civil War,11 while harboring 
explicitly racist attitudes towards the Black Canadian community,12 the 
U.S. analysis of corporate history is relevant to Canada. Understanding 
the corporation as a means of entrenching existing power relations helps 
uncover at a theoretical level why corporate accountability is so difficult.  
To add another level to this structural analysis, international law it-
self can pose a barrier to justice. I focus on international law here because 
it is the primary justice mechanism for abuses conducted outside of an 
 
 6. See Amanda Werner, Corporations Are (White) People: How Corporate Privilege Reifies 
Whiteness as Property, 31 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 129, 134-35 (2015); ADAM WINKLER, 
WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS xv (2018) (“At 
the same time the [Supreme Court] was upholding Jim Crow laws . . . the justices were invalidating 
minimum-wage laws, curtailing collective bargaining efforts, voiding manufacturing restrictions 
. . . . The Fourteenth Amendment, adopted to shield the former slaves from discrimination, had 
been transformed into a sword used by corporations to strike at unwanted regulation”). 
 7. Werner, supra note 6, at 135 (“Because the power to exclude is so central to the white 
identity, when the Civil War amendments forced whites to share the public space, they responded 
by situating many of their interests in the private sphere and erecting the arbitrary barrier of state 
action to keep blacks out”). 
 8. W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 1860-1880 30 (Free Press, 1st 
ed. 1998). 
 9. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 10. HISTORICAL ATLAS OF CANADA: VOLUME III: ADDRESSING THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
1891-1961, at 13-14 (Donald Kerr & Deryck W. Holdsworth eds., 1990). 
 11. See ROBIN W. WINKS, BLACKS IN CANADA: A HISTORY 288-92 (1997). A second wave 
of fear arose at the turn of the century when Canadians realized that many of the newcomers and 
their children would likely remain in Canada permanently, rather than return during Reconstruction 
as they had previously assumed. Id. at 289-92. 
 12. See, e.g., Matthew Furrow, Samuel Gridley Howe, the Black Population of Canada West, 
and the Racial Ideology of the “Blueprint for Radical Reconstruction,” 97 J. AM. HIST. 344, 356 
(2010); GREG MARQUIS, ARMAGEDDON’S SHADOW: THE CIVIL WAR AND CANADA’S MARITIME 
PROVINCES 59-84 (1998). 
FINAL_FOR_JCI 8/16/21  8:01 PM 
2021] A Cielo Abierto 161 
MNC’s country of origin.13 But international law is not neutral: “it was 
only because of colonialism that international law became universal; and 
the dynamic of difference, the civilising mission, that produced this re-
sult, continues into the present.”14 For example, the law’s characterization 
of original inhabitants as “inferior” legitimized conquest; at the same 
time, however, in many cases these “inferior” individuals were nonethe-
less able to enter treaties handing territories over to Europeans.15 Ulti-
mately, much of international law was developed to serve colonial inter-
ests.16  
This process did not end with decolonization. Decolonization simply 
meant that colonialism was replaced by neocolonialism.17 In other words, 
a blanket was thrown over the structural inequality that was a direct result 
of colonialism, effectively hushing any protest that the cessation of colo-
nialism, and the grant of “rights” presumed to accompany it, did not nec-
essarily dismantle the systems creating inequality. A similar hushing of 
inequality was the basis of undermining the Civil Rights amendments in 
the U.S. context.18 
Pulling these two dimensions together, B.S. Chimini notes that “a 
whole host of international laws seek to free transnational capital of spa-
tial and temporal constraints.”19 Chimini discusses, for example, the 
 
 13. Space has certainly opened (and closed, in the U.S. context) for domestic remedies. See, 
e.g., Brian Sableman, Note, Ending Alien Tort Statute Exceptionalism: Corporate Liability in the 
Wake of Jesner v. Arab Bank and Implications for U.S. Private Military Contractors, 63 ST. LOUIS 
U. L.J. 349, 364 (2019). For a more hopeful future on domestic remedies in the Canadian context, 
see Nevsun Resources Ltd. v. Araya [2020] 5 S.C.R (Can.), also discussed below. 
 14. Antony Anghie, The Evolution of International Law: Colonial and Postcolonial Realities, 
27 THIRD WORLD Q. 739, 742 (2006). 
 15. Id. at 745. 
 16. See James Thuo Gathii, TWAIL: A Brief History of its Origins, its Decentralized Network, 
and a Tentative Bibliography, 3 TRADE L. & DEV. 26 passim (2011) (giving an overview of schol-
ars exploring this connection extensively). 
 17. Anghie, supra note 14, at 749; B. S. Chimini, Third World Approaches to International 
Law: A Manifesto, 8 INT’L CMTY. L. REV. 3, 14 (2006) (“Poor and rich states are to be treated alike 
in the new century and the principle of special and differential treatment is to be slowly but surely 
discarded”). 
 18. The U.S. Supreme Court stated just 15 years after the passage of the Civil Rights amend-
ments, “[w]hen a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation has shaken 
off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the progress of his ele-
vation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws.” 
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883). This false baseline continues to be a tool of disman-
tling civil rights. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 295 (1978) (“The clock of 
our liberties, however, cannot be turned back to 1868 . . . . It is far too late to argue that the guar-
antee of equal protection to all persons permits the recognition of special wards entitled to a degree 
of protection greater than that accorded others”). 
 19. Chimini, supra note 17, at 9 n.25. 
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“internationalization of property rights” for the benefit of MNC opera-
tions,20 the jurisdictional limits of international law,21 the increased influ-
ence of MNCs in developing international law,22 and increased MNC 
funding for the United Nations.23 The interplay between neocolonialism 
and corporate exceptionalism is deeply relevant to the history of the 
Americas.24 
This paper focuses on the potential of international human rights law 
to address environmental abuses through the lens of economic, social, 
and cultural rights. Human rights law has been criticized for simply main-
taining the status quo, for reasons related to the development of interna-
tional law outlined above.25 While this is a valid critique, I, perhaps opti-
mistically, trace recent developments in human rights that may disrupt 
this stagnation.26 Concretely, I use the closure of the Marlin Mine in 
Western Guatemala as an example of ongoing injustice to argue that 
changing human rights norms indicate Canada can no longer hide under 
the aforementioned blanket, and to underscore the urgency of interpreting 
these legal developments in this way.  
 
 20. Id. at 8. 
 21. Id. at 12. 
 22. Id. at 13. 
 23. Id. at 14. 
 24. The extraction of free labor from enslaved Africans in the U.S. and the Americas more 
broadly was an essential piece of the colonial logic that is the foundation of racial capitalism. See 
generally CEDRIC J. ROBINSON, BLACK MARXISM: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK RADICAL 
TRADITION (U. of N. Carolina Press 2d ed., 2000) (1983). 
 25. Chimini himself criticizes the way human rights law centers property rights to the benefit 
of MNCs and to the detriment of Third World peoples. Chimini, supra note 17, at 12. See also 
Tshepo Madlingozi, Social Justice in a Time of Neo-Apartheid Constitutionalism: Critiquing the 
Anti-Black Economy of Recognition, Incorporation and Distribution, 28 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 
123, 136 (2017) (Human rights “cannot dislodge white supremacy, institutional racism and struc-
tural exclusion and invisibility”); Anna Spain Bradley, Human Rights Racism, 32 HARV. HUM. 
RTS. J. 1, 58 (2019) (“Naming the challenge as human rights racism aims to illuminate the depth 
of the problem and to reveal the ways that international human rights law is not racially neutral”). 
This is by no means a new critique; for example, practitioners and scholars of liberation theology 
in the last century have denounced the Western vision of human rights, which focuses excessively 
on the individual and obscures the collective harms that imperial and neo-imperial relations have 
imposed on the Third World. PHILLIP BERRYMAN, LIBERATION THEOLOGY: ESSENTIAL FACTS 
ABOUT THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND BEYOND 115-18 (Bert B. 
Lockwood, Jr. ed., 1987). On individualism versus collectivism, see also MAKAU MUTUA, HUMAN 
RIGHTS A POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CRITIQUE 71 (2002). 
 26. “Can anything be done to redeem the human rights corpus, as well as its movement and 
discourse? I think so . . . The current corpus is largely a product of the West . . . . It is only from a 
healthy intercourse of different types of knowledge that a new human rights project can emerge.” 
MAKAU MUTUA, HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS: HEGEMONY, LAW, AND POLITICS viii (2016). 
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III.  CASE STUDY: THE MARLIN MINE  
The Marlin Mine is a gold mine located in western Guatemala, in 
the Department of San Marcos, on the territory of the Maya Sipacapa 
community in Sipacapa and the Maya Mam community in San Miguel 
Ixtahuacán.27 Glamis Gold, a Canadian company, through its wholly-
owned subsidiary, Montana Exploradora, developed the mine.28 In 2006, 
Glamis Gold merged with another Canadian company, Goldcorp Inc.29 
Human rights violations pre-dated the merger and continued afterwards.30 
The close connection between environmental damage and other human 
rights violations are notable in the story of Marlin.  
Although this paper focuses on a single mine, lessons from the Mar-
lin story can be applied to many other situations. This is particularly true 
considering a 2013 estimate that 75% of the world’s mining companies 
are based in Canada,31 and a 2017 estimate that 65% of Canadian mining 
assets are located abroad, with 70% of those assets residing in the Amer-
icas.32 
A.  Human Rights Abuses During Consultations 
The substandard consultation process deserves mention as a founda-
tional moment in the story of the mine as it was the basis of a number of 
legal battles. Initially, the company only consulted communities in San 
Miguel Ixtahuacán, despite the proximity of Sipacapa and its potential for 
social impact.33 For this and other reasons, the Compliance Advisor Om-
budsman (CAO) and the accountability mechanism of the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), which in part funded the mine, concluded in 
2005 that the consultation process did not adequately consider Mayan 
 
 27. See generally Simona V. Yagenova & Rocío Garcia, Indigenous People’s Struggles 
Against Transnational Mining Companies in Guatemala: The Sipakapa People vs GoldCorp Min-
ing Company, 23 SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 157, 159-60 (2009). 
 28. Joris van de Sandt, Mining Conflicts and Indigenous Peoples in Guatemala, CATH. ORG. 
FOR RELIEF AND DEV. AID, Sept. 2009, at 19. 
 29. Id. at 12. 
 30. See, e.g., ON COMMON GROUND CONSULTANTS INC., supra note 3, at 198 (finding that 
Montana Exploradora likely infringed mine employees’ right to association by selectively dismiss-
ing individuals that attempted to form a union). 
 31. Dave Dean, 75% of the World’s Mining Companies Are Based in Canada, VICE MEDIA 
GRP. (Jul. 9, 2013, 1:59 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_ca/article/wdb4j5/75-of-the-worlds-min-
ing-companies-are-based-in-canada. 
 32. NAT. RES. CAN., MINERALS AND THE ECONOMY (2019), https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/our-
natural-resources/minerals-mining/minerals-metals-facts/minerals-and-economy/20529. 
 33. ON COMMON GROUND CONSULTANTS INC., supra note 3, at 8. 
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customary perspectives and local decision-making norms.34 For example, 
a popular consultation took place in June 2005 in Sipacapa where an ab-
solute majority (98%) voted against the project.35 However, the Guate-
malan Constitutional Court ultimately ruled that this consultation was 
nonbinding,36 and the International Labour Organization (ILO) clarified 
that the obligation to ensure proper consultation lies with the State and 
not the company.37 Corporations, as a “class of innocents,”38 were not to 
blame and the development of the Marlin Mine moved forward.  
This troubled beginning demonstrates the inability of international 
law to reach either private actors or MNC origin countries extraterritori-
ally. Considering existing global inequalities that often render host States 
like Guatemala unable or unwilling to properly address these problems, 
the gaping hole in human rights protections, specifically for individuals 
in the Global South, is clear.  
B.  Human Rights Violations During Mine Operations  
Since the establishment of the Marlin Mine, residents have reported 
skin infections, among other health problems.39 Between 2008 and 2010, 
the Guatemalan Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources filed 
 
 34. COMPLIANCE ADVISOR OMBUDSMAN (CAO), ASSESSMENT OF A COMPLAINT 
SUBMITTED TO CAO IN RELATION TO THE MARLIN MINING PROJECT IN GUATEMALA 32 (2005) 
[hereinafter Complaint]. 
 35. Yagenova & Garcia, supra note 27, at 160-61. See also id. at 5. 
 36. Yagenova & Garcia, supra note 27, at 162. 
 37. ON COMMON GROUND CONSULTANTS INC., supra note 3, at 5. See also BIRGITTE 
FEIRING, ADVISOR INT’L LABOUR ORG., HANDBOOK FOR ILO TRIPARTITE CONSTITUENTS: 
UNDERSTANDING THE INDIGENOUS AND TRIBAL PEOPLES CONVENTION, 1989 (No. 169), at 14 
(2013). 
 38. Alan Freeman argues that anti-discrimination law’s focus on intentional discrimination 
“creates a class of innocents, who need not feel any personal responsibility for the conditions asso-
ciated with discrimination, and who therefore feel great resentment when called upon to bear any 
burdens in connection with remedying violations.” Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Dis-
crimination through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 
MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1055 (1978) (internal quotations omitted). Likewise here, corporations are 
insulated from accountability despite benefitting from inequitable circumstances (here, Guate-
mala’s unwillingness to enforce consultation requirements, likely a result of the disproportionate 
power and influence of capital from the North in the Global South). Anti-discrimination law devel-
oped to protect complicit whites – and corporate law essentially does the same, obscuring systemic 
inequities that it produces and perpetuates. 
 39. Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 20/14, Petition 1556-07, Communities of the 
Sipakepense and Mam Mayan People of the Municipalities of Sipacapa and San Miguel Ixtahuacán, 
Guatemala, ¶ 16 (Apr. 3, 2014). See also Urgent Action: Crackdown on Local Citizens Opposing 
Goldcorp’s “Marlin” Mine Escalates in San Marcos, Guatemala, BREAKING THE SILENCE NET 
(July 18, 2008, 6:30 AM), https://www.breakingthesilencenet.blogspot.com/2008/07/urgent-ac-
tioncrackdown-on-local.html. 
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three separate complaints against the mine relating to the location of the 
tailings dam, a spill of toxic materials, and the unauthorized discharge of 
the tailings dam.40 In May 2010, a Physicians for Human Rights study 
found higher concentrations of blood lead, as well as urinary mercury, 
arsenic, copper, and zinc in residents close to the mine.41 However, the 
study explained that it is “not clear if the current magnitude of these ele-
vations poses a significant threat to health,” and recommended additional 
study as these impacts tend to increase with the life of the mine.42 It fur-
ther detailed the harm caused to the cultural fabric of the Mam Mayan 
community as a result of the environmental damage, with residents ex-
pressing fear for the future due to the pollution in the river.43 In August 
2010, the NGO E-Tech International evaluated a number of studies per-
formed on the water quality near Marlin. The report found that the water 
in the tailings dam exceeded IFC guidelines for allowable concentrations 
of cyanide, copper, and mercury, and that the mine’s waste had a “mod-
erate to high potential to generate acid and leach contaminants,” posing a 
risk to water resources.44 
Parallel to these environmental issues, social harms also emerged. 
These social harms were felt most acutely by those criminalized for their 
resistance. In January 2007, community members blocked access to the 
mine until Montana Exploradora agreed to meet with them; however, ra-
ther than meet and confer, seven arrest warrants were issued to individu-
als involved in the blockade for coercion and instigating delinquency, 
among other charges.45 In February 2007, the National Civil Police for-
cibly removed two of the individuals for whom warrants were issued 
from their homes and jailed them for three days.46 They were sentenced 
 
 40. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
of indigenous people, James Anaya, Observations on the situation of the rights of the indigenous 
people of Guatemala with relation to the extraction projects, and other types of projects, in their 
traditional territories, Hum. Rts. Council, 18th Sess., ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/18/35/Add.3 (June 7, 
2011). 
 41. NILADRI BASU & HOWARD HU, TOXIC METALS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES NEAR THE 
MARLIN MINE IN WESTERN GUATEMALA: POTENTIAL EXPOSURES AND IMPACTS ON HEALTH 3, 
15 (Susannah Sirkin ed., 2010). 
 42. Id. at 3. 
 43. Id. at 16. 
 44. ANN MAEST & DICK KAMP, EVALUATION OF PREDICTED AND ACTUAL WATER QUALITY 
CONDITIONS AT THE MARLIN MINE, GUATEMALA 6-7 (2010). 
 45. John Ahni Schertow, Trial of “Goldcorp 7” Continues in Guatemala, 
INTERCONTINENTAL CRY (Nov. 28, 2007), https://www.intercontinentalcry.org/trial-of-goldcorp-
7-continues-in-guatemala/. 
 46. James Rodriguez, Mina de oro agrava situación social, DEGUATE (Jul. 19, 2007, 8:21 
AM), https://www.deguate.com/artman/publish/article_10762.shtml. 
FINAL_FOR_JCI 8/16/21  8:01 PM 
166 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 44:2 
to two years of probation and a fine, while the other five individuals were 
acquitted of all charges.47 In June 2008, arrest warrants were issued 
against eight women who also actively opposed the mine.48 These inci-
dents illustrate how a host State’s judiciary can be used to further the 
interests of private actors from the Global North. Once again, this demon-
strates the pressing need for MNCs’ home States to play a role in protect-
ing human rights. 
Important moments in the subsequent seven years of mine operation 
include: a 2010 order from the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights to cease mine operations, later revised to only require Guatemala 
to ensure that residents had potable water;49 a 2012 visit to the Marlin site 
by a number of Canadian Members of Parliament (on Goldcorp’s dime);50 
and a 2014 determination by the Inter-American Commission for Human 
Rights that the petition of the Sipacapa and Mam Mayan communities 
against Guatemala was admissible on the basis of violations to their rights 
of, inter alia, consultation, equal protection, and the progressive develop-
ment of economic, social and cultural rights.51 Production at Marlin 
ceased in May 2017, and Marlin became the first commercial mine in 
Guatemala to undergo a formal closure process.52  
C.  Remedies Sought in Guatemala During the Mine’s Operation  
Guatemala did not offer many remedies during the mine’s operation. 
In 2007, the NGO Madreselva sought an amparo, a kind of injunction, on 
behalf of the Sipacapa community against a number of Guatemalan gov-
ernment agencies for issuing a mining license without proper consultation 
as required by ILO 169.53 The Constitutional Court not only denied the 
amparo, but also fined the attorneys that represented Madreselva for 
 
 47. John Ahni Schertow, Goldcorp 7 Verdict is In. . . Justice in Guatemala?, 
INTERCONTINENTAL CRY (Dec. 17, 2007), https://www.intercontinentalcry.org/goldcorp-7-verdict
-is-injustice-in-guatemala/. 
 48. Report No. 20/14, supra note 39, ¶ 22. 
 49. Precautionary Measures: PM 260-07 - Communities of the Maya People (Sipakepense and 
Mam) of the Sipacapa and San Miguel Ixtahuacán Municipalities in the Department of San Marcos, 
Guatemala, ORG. OF AM. STATES, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/precautionary.asp?Year
=2010&Country=GTM (last visited Feb. 24, 2021). 
 50. Jen Moore, Goldcorp Organizes Junket to Guatemala for Canadian Parliamentarians, 
MINING WATCH CAN. (Aug. 28, 2012), https://www.miningwatch.ca/news/2012/8/28/goldcorp-or-
ganizes-junket-guatemala-canadian-parliamentarians. 
 51. Report No. 20/14, supra note 39, ¶ 14. 
 52. BUS. FOR SOC. RESP., supra note 4, at 6. 
 53. Corte de Constitucionalidad [Constitutional Court], Jan. 9, 2008, En Calidad de Tribunal 
Extraordinario de Amparo, Expediente 123-2007, Amparo en Unica Instancia, p. 1-2 (Guat.). 
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presenting a “notoriously improper” amparo.54 This is particularly dis-
turbing considering that in 2005, Montana Exploradora itself sought an 
amparo against the municipality of Sipacapa, asking the Constitutional 
Court to find the community consultation unconstitutional.55 It found the 
consultation non-binding, but not unconstitutional – and no fines were 
imposed on those lawyers.56  
This illustrates that, although in theory, Guatemala could act to pro-
tect communities such as the Sipacapa and Mam Mayan communities, in 
practice it cannot. Canada, on the other hand, is able to influence opera-
tions abroad to a much greater extent.57 Establishing comprehensive and 
effective regulations in Canada on mining and mine closure abroad would 
fill this long-ignored (and arguably built-in) gap in international human 
rights law. Legal developments that focus on the responsibility of States 
that domicile corporations, as will be discussed further, can help ensure 
that the blanket obscuring of deeply rooted global inequities cannot con-
tinue to insulate beneficiaries of the system from accountability. 
D.  Human Rights Violations Arising from Mine Closure 
Guatemala’s mining laws did not regulate closure when Marlin shut 
down in 2017.58 A month after Marlin’s closure, Goldcorp released a re-
port indicating that it had fulfilled the majority of its human rights com-
mitments arising from the 2010 On Common Ground report.59 Goldcorp 
approved a $75 million budget for closure, not including severance pay-
ments or post-closure monitoring, which it estimated would amount to 
 
 54. Id. at 7-8. 
 55. Corte de Constitucionalidad [Constitutional Court], Feb. 28, 2008, Expedientes 
Acumulados 1643-2005 y 1654-2005, Apelacion de Sentencia en Amparo, p. 1, (Guat.). 
 56. Id. at 8-9. For more on domestic remedies pursued in Guatemala, see Raquel Aldana, 
Transforming Students, Transforming Self: The Power of Teaching Social Justice Struggles in Con-
text, 24 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOB. BUS. & DEV. L.J. 53, 69-71 (2011). 
 57. Canadian Embassies, for example, are generally involved in facilitating the work of Ca-
nadian firms operating abroad. See Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Indigenous Peoples, Afro-Descendent 
Communities, and Natural Resources: Human Rights Protection in the Context of Extraction, Ex-
ploitation, and Development Activities, at 45-46, OEA/Ser.L/V/II., doc. 47/15 (Dec. 31, 2015). 
 58. BUS. FOR SOC. RESP., supra note 4, at 16-17. See also Montana Exploradora de Guate-
mala, S.A., MINA MARLIN: PLAN DE CIERRE [MARLIN MINE CLOSURE PLAN] 7-9 (2017), 
https://www.newmont-marlin.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Plan-de-Cierre-Mina-Marlin-
MEM.pdf. (outlining the various applicable national and legal standards for mining in Guatemala 
generally, with no mention of specific closure standards). 
 59. BUS. FOR SOC. RESP., supra note 4, at 6. 
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$11 million.60 How much Goldcorp would pay for closure did not proceed 
without controversy.61  
What this money actually goes to (assuming it is allocated appropri-
ately)62 is unclear, since the government of Guatemala continues to insist 
that the infrastructural damage in the area was not due to the mine.63 This 
infrastructural damage includes cracked homes, bridges, and roads.64 In 
addition, the social divisions between those who supported the mine and 
those who opposed it also persists, eroding trust and a sense of commu-
nity responsibility.65 
 
 60. Id. at 19. 
 61. In 2010 Goldcorp posted a $1 million bond with the Guatemalan government for unantic-
ipated costs. BUS. FOR SOC. RESP., supra note 4, at 19. In 2012 it agreed to post an additional $27 
million after Rob Robinson, an American mine and environmental engineer, presented a share-
holder resolution together with the Unitarian Universalist Service Committee to Goldcorp urging 
an increased bond amount in light of his estimate that the actual closure costs would be $49 million. 
Communities Shouldn’t Pay To Clean Up Goldcorp’s Mess in Central America, MINING WATCH 
CAN. (June 15, 2012, 3:42 PM), https://www.miningwatch.ca/blog/2012/6/15/communities-
shouldn-t-pay-clean-goldcorp-s-mess-central-america; AMBER MOULTON, UNITARIAN 
UNIVERSALIST SERV. COMM., DEFENDING THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER: A DECADE OF 
SUPPORT FOR GLOBAL WATER JUSTICE 23 (2015), http://www.uusc.org/sites/default/files/human
_right_to_water_retrospective.pdf. See also KEITH CAMPBELL ET AL., ASUNTOS DE 
RECUPERACIÓN Y COSTOS APROXIMADOS PARA LA RECUPERACIÓN DE LA MINA MARLIN, 
COPAE & UUSC 9 (Molly Butler, Maria J. Van Der Maaten, H. Alejandro Alfaro Santiz, trans., 
2010), https://www.goldcorpoutofguatemala.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/reclamation-issues-and
-estimated-cost-of-reclamation-marlin-mine.pdf. 
 62. It is important to note here the close relationship of the Guatemalan elite with the devel-
opment of mining projects. For example, Oscar Berger, President of Guatemala from 2004 to 2008, 
was an important supporter of the development of mining, and particularly the Marlin Mine. His 
cousin, Francois Berger, was married to Maria Eugenia Novella de Berger. During Serrano Elías’ 
administration in the early 90s, Novella was essential in the naming of Milton Estuardo Saravia 
Rodríguez as the Executive Secretary of the National Council of Protected Areas, a role for which 
many believed he was not qualified. Saravia Rodríguez later became the general manager of Mon-
tana Exploradora, responsible for the Marlin Mine. See Luis Solano, La transnacionalización de la 
industria extractiva: la captura de los recursos minerales e hidrocarburos, 4 EL OBSERVADOR 19, 
June – July 2009, at 3, 26, https://www.issuu.com/observadorguatemala/docs/el_observador_no._
19_hunio_2009; DIEGO PADILLA VASSAUX, POLÍTICA DEL AGUA EN GUATEMALA: UNA 
CADIOGRAFÍA CRÍTICA DEL ESTADO 7 n.65 (Cara Parens ed., 2019), https://www.plaza
publica.com.gt/sites/default/files/digital_politica_del_agua_en_guatemala.pdf. 
 63. Según Conred, daños a casas no fueron por actividad minera, LA HORA (Aug. 29, 2019), 
https://www.lahora.gt/segun-conred-danos-a-casas-no-fueron-por-actividad-minera/. 
 64. Frente de Defensa San Miguelense, supra note 4, at 9. See also Fredemi San Miguel 
(@fredemi.sanmiguel), FACEBOOK (Feb. 16, 2018, 2:04 PM), https://www.facebook.com/fre-
demi.sanmiguel/videos/1982969668622086/. 
 65. Jeff Abbott, Something in the water: The lasting violence of a Canadian mining company 
in Guatemala, (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.briarpatchmagazine.com/articles/view/something-in-
the-water. An extreme example of the social divisions that mine closure can have is the Fénix mine 
in Izabal, Guatemala. In 2019 the Guatemala Constitutional Court granted an injunction to a union 
of fishermen who alleged the mine was opened without proper consultation and had created 
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The current environmental harm and future risks are serious. Water 
has been an ongoing issue; residents note that 28 sources of water have 
dried up.66 Rob Robinson, an American mining and environmental engi-
neer who investigated Marlin’s closure, highlights other environmental 
risks including the tailings dam leaking (which would likely be toxic 
since cyanide was used to dissolve gold from ore), water entering the 
open pit and carrying toxic material into groundwater, and erosion during 
heavy rains due to the steep slopes of the rock dump.67 Montana Explo-
radora will monitor the site until 2026,68 although Robinson concludes 
that monitoring for at least thirty years, rather than ten, is necessary to 
mitigate the risks outlined above.69  
Goldcorp has been quiet on the closure process, discreetly acknowl-
edging for example that “[m]ine closure, reclamation and remediation 
costs for environmental liabilities may exceed the provisions we have 
made,” mentioning, among others, an unnamed closed mine site in Gua-
temala, in its 2020 SEC 10-K filing.70 This may be a standard risk disclo-
sure, but that’s not all it says about Guatemala. It also specifically cites 
community opposition to the Marlin Mine and the 2010 Inter-American 
 
environmental damage. This led community members who supported the mine to file a request for 
provisional measures from the Inter-American Commission, alleging that the closure and resulting 
loss of economic opportunities was a violation of their economic, social and cultural rights.  The 
Covid-19 pandemic impeded the implementation of the Constitutional Court’s injunction. CIDH y 
las presencias de ONU Derechos Humanos reiteran su llamado para la creación de un ambiente 
propicio y seguro para quienes defienden los derechos humanos en la región, ORG. OF AM. STATES 
(Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/prensa/comunicados/2019/288.asp; Natiana Gándara, 
Mina de níquel acudirá a Corte Interamericana por cierre de operación en Guatemala, PRENSA 
LIBRE (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.prensalibre.com/economia/mina-fenix-representantes-de-
trabajadores-y-empresarios-acudiran-a-la-cidh/. See also Pobladores de El Estor solicitan medidas 
cautelares ante la CIDH por suspensión de Mina Fénix, IMPACTO.GT (Aug. 9, 2019), 
https://www.impacto.gt/pobladores-de-el-estor-solicitan-medidas-cautelares-ante-la-cidh-por-sus-
pension-de-mina-fenix; Solicitarán medidas cautelares por cierre de proyecto minero Fénix, 
MININGWORKS.GT (Aug. 6, 2019), http://www.miningworks.gt/mineria-responsable/cgn-
solicitara-medidas-cautelares-ante-la-cidh-por-suspension-de-actividades-en-mina-fenix/; Jody 
García (@JodyNomada), TWITTER (July 25, 2019, 11:23 AM), https://www.twitter.com
/i/status/1154427031016394752; Anna-Catherine Brigida, Una polémica mina de níquel de 
Guatemala “ignora el confinamiento por coronavirus”, MONGABAY (Aug. 28, 2021), https://
www.es.mongabay.com/2020/08/una-polemica-mina-de-niquel-de-guatemala-ignora-el-
confinamiento-por-coronavirus/. 
 66. Abbott, supra note 65, at 8. See also, San Miguel, supra note 64. 
 67. Robert H. Robinson, Presenter at Special Session: Legal Strategies to Address Goldcorp’s 
Marlin Mine Closure, Workshop of the Centre for Indigenous Conservation and Development Al-
ternatives held at McGill University (June 20, 2018) (slides on file with author). 
 68. BUS. FOR SOC. RESP., supra note 4, at 7. 
 69. Robinson, supra note 67. 
 70. Newmont Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 17 (Feb. 20, 2020). Newmont bought Gold-
corp in 2019. Id. at 5. 
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Commission order to close the mine. Goldcorp even cited that “evolving 
expectations related to human rights, indigenous rights, and environmen-
tal protections may result in opposition to our current and future opera-
tions. . . Opposition by community and activist groups to our operations 
may require modification of, or preclude the operation or development 
of, our projects and mines or may require us to enter into agreements with 
such groups or local governments.”71 
IV.  INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORKS ON MINE CLOSURE 
Despite an increasing focus on State responsibility vis-à-vis private 
actors based in those countries,72 international law does not offer specific 
guidance on mine closure.73 The existing guidelines focus on encouraging 
effective domestic legislation.74 However, a limited number of domestic 
jurisdictions effectively regulate mine closure, such as Canada where in-
dividual provinces manage mining regulation within their territories.75 
For this reason, establishing international responsibility in relation to 
mine closure is imperative. I argue that existing human rights law creates 
obligations for home States of MNCs that engage in mine closure abroad.  
In the universal human rights system, the ICESCR is an important 
instrument from which such responsibility can be derived. The Economic 
and Social Council, the treaty body of the ICESCR, specifically addresses 
the role of private actors in guaranteeing human rights in General Com-
ment 24.76 It confirmed that: 
[e]xtraterritorial obligations arise when a State party may in-
fluence situations located outside its territory . . . by control-
ling the activities of corporations domiciled in its territory 
 
 71. Id. at 24.   
 72. See, e.g., U.N. Off. of the High Comm’r for Hum. Rts. [OHCHR], Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights (2011), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrin-
ciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf; ORGANISATION FOR ECON. COOP. AND DEV., OECD GUIDELINES FOR 
MULTINATIONAL ENTER. (2011). 
 73. A. Morrison-Saunders et al., Integrating Mine Closure Planning with Environmental Im-
pact Assessment:Challenges and Opportunities Drawn from African and Australian Practice, 34 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND PROJECT APPRAISAL 117, 118 (2016) (discussing international industry 
expectations rather than firm guidance). 
 74. See CHRISTOPHER G. SHELDON ET AL., IT’S NOT OVER WHEN IT’S OVER: MINE CLOSURE 
AROUND THE WORLD 10 (2002); GANKHUYAG & GREGOIRE, supra note 5, at 420. 
 75. ALLEN L. CLARK & JENNIFER COOK CLARK, AN INTERNATIONAL OVERVIEW OF LEGAL 
FRAMEWORKS FOR MINE CLOSURE 67 (2005); Vivoda et al., supra note 5, at 10. See, e.g., The 
Mines and Minerals Act, Mine Closure Regulation, C.C.S.M. 67/99 (Can.). 
 76. U.N, Econ. & Soc. Council, Gen. Comment No. 24 on State Obligations Under the Int’l 
Covenant on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts. in the Context of Bus. Activities ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/GC/24 (Aug. 10, 2017). 
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and/or under its jurisdiction, and thus may contribute to the 
effective enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights 
outside its national territory.77  
This was not the first time this duty was clarified. In 2011, the Eco-
nomic and Social Council published a statement on the obligations of 
States regarding the corporate sector.78 In addition, the Economic and So-
cial Council has previously affirmed the ICESCR’s extraterritorial appli-
cation with regards to the right to health,79 and the right to water,80 both 
relevant here. As such, States’ responsibility to prevent third parties over 
which they exercise influence from violating the economic, social, and 
cultural rights of individuals outside their territories is not new.81  
Canada is a party to the ICESCR, but not its Optional Protocol, 
which allows the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to 
receive communications from individuals alleging violations of rights 
protected by the ICESCR.82 Nonetheless, as a party to the ICESCR, Can-
ada is obligated to provide periodic reports to the Committee every five 
years.83 The Committee then provides concluding observations in re-
sponse to these periodic reports.  
 
 77. Id. ¶ 28. 
 78. U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Statement on the Obligations of States Parties Regarding the 
Corp. Sector and Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2011/1 (July 12, 2011). 
 79. U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the Int’l 
Covenant of Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts. ¶ 39, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000) (“To 
comply with their international obligations in relation to article 12, States parties have to respect 
the enjoyment of the right to health in other countries, and to prevent third parties from violating 
the right in other countries, if they are able to influence these third parties by way of legal or polit-
ical means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and applicable international law”). 
 80. U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the Int’l 
Covenant of Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts. ¶ 33, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003) (“Steps 
should be taken by States parties to prevent their own citizens and companies from violating the 
right to water of individuals and communities in other countries”). 
 81. More recently, in relation to the right to life as guaranteed in the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment 36 
made clear that States must take appropriate legislative and other measures to ensure that all activ-
ities taking place in whole or in part within their territory and in other places subject to their juris-
diction, but having a direct and reasonably foreseeable impact on the right to life of individuals 
outside their territory, including activities taken by corporate entities based in their territory or 
subject to their jurisdiction, are consistent with Article 6 [of the ICCPR]. Hum. Rts. Comm., Gen-
eral Comment No. 36, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36 (Sept. 3, 2019) (citations omitted). 
 82. G.A. Res. 63/117, at 2 (Dec. 10, 2008). 
 83. See Canada’s Appearance at the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, CANADA, https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/services/canada-united-
nations-system/reports-united-nations-treaties/commitments-economic-social-cultural-rights/can-
ada-appearance.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2021). 
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Canada’s next periodic report is upcoming, as its last report was 
made in 2016.84 On that occasion, the Committee noted its concern “that 
the conduct of corporations registered or domiciled in the State party and 
operating abroad is, on occasion, negatively impacting on the enjoyment 
of Covenant rights by local populations.”85 It recommended that Canada 
strengthen legislation governing such operations, including requiring hu-
man rights impact assessments prior to initiating projects, establishing 
more robust and effective mechanisms to receive complaints, and facili-
tating justice in local courts for victims of such abuses.86  
In the concluding observations of periodic reports issued since the 
release of General Comment 24, the Committee has consistently recom-
mended that States in the Global North adopt a legal framework that re-
quires businesses domiciled in each State to exercise human rights dili-
gence, allows businesses in violation of ESC rights to be held liable, and 
enables victims to seek remedies domestically.87 However, the proce-
dures available against Canada by means of the ICESCR are limited due 
to its non-ratification of the Optional Protocol. This again is a symptom 
of how international law is built and applied by powerful States to limit 
the justiciability of certain abuses. Even so, the Committee’s interpreta-
tion of the ICESCR clearly establishes the expectation in international 
human rights law that countries exert their influence over private actors 
that are domiciled in their state when such influence can limit or remedy 
human rights abuses abroad, an obligation that should extend to mine clo-
sure. This is a step towards cracking the international human rights sys-
tem’s resistance to addressing these kinds of abuses.  
V.  REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM AND MINE 
CLOSURE 
Rights surrounding mine closure have yet to be addressed by the In-
ter-American system, but relevant rights and responsibilities can be de-
rived from existing sources. In 2017, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights took a monumental step forward in recognizing environmental 
 
 84. U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of 
Canada, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/CAN/CO/6 (Mar. 23, 2016). 
 85. Id. ¶ 15. 
 86. Id. ¶ 16. 
 87. U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of 
Belgium ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/BEL/CO/5 (Mar. 25, 2020); U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Con-
cluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of Switzerland ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/CHE/CO/4 (Nov. 18, 2019); U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Concluding Observations on the 
Sixth Periodic Report of Denmark ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/DNK/CO/6 (Nov. 12, 2019). 
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rights when it issued Advisory Opinion 23, which places the right to a 
healthy environment squarely within the framework of economic, social 
and cultural rights as contemplated in Article 26 of the American Con-
vention on Human Rights.88 The Advisory Opinion goes even further by 
saying that States must “take measures to prevent significant damage to 
the environment, within or outside their territory.”89  
This important development reflects the “evolving expectations re-
lated to human rights”90 that Goldcorp alluded to. However, in the context 
of the Marlin Mine and similar situations, a number of dots must be con-
nected for this development to make a difference in practice, including 
the applicability of the Convention to non-parties such as Canada and its 
extraterritorial application. 
A.  The American Convention and Non-Party OAS States 
A majority of the States which form the Organization for American 
States (OAS) have signed the American Convention on Human Rights, 
on which Advisory Opinion 23 is based. However, a number have not – 
most notably, the United States and Canada. Accordingly, holding ac-
countable a host State, such as Canada in the Marlin context, which has 
conveniently insulated itself from accountability, becomes challenging. 
Nonetheless, there may be a way forward. This framework leaves two 
links that must be established, the first easier than the second: (1) whether 
petitions can be lodged against a non-party to the Convention; and (2) 
whether a right read into the Convention can indicate an obligation for 
non-parties. I propose the answer to both is yes. 
The Inter-American system does offer some accountability for the 
actions of OAS States that have not ratified the Convention. Although 
only those States that have ratified the Convention fall under the jurisdic-
tion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, all OAS States are 
held to their obligations in the American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man, and thus subject to procedures under the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights.91 Article 20 of the Commission’s Statute 
 
 88. Environment and Human Rights (State Obligations in Relation to the Environment in the 
Context of the Protection and Guarantee of the Rights to Life and to Personal Integrity: Interpreta-
tion and Scope of Articles 4(1) and 5(1) in Relation to Articles 1(1) and 2 of the American Con-
vention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 23 ¶ 57 
(Nov. 15, 2017). 
 89. Id. ¶ 140 (emphasis added). 
 90. Newmont Corp., supra note 70, at 24. 
 91. Coard v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 14/94, 
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.85, doc. 25 at 9 (1994). 
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empowers the Commission to examine communications and request in-
formation from a non-party OAS State and make recommendations to 
that State “in order to bring about more effective observance of funda-
mental human rights.”92 Likewise, Article 51 of the Commission’s Reg-
ulations empowers the Commission to “receive and examine any petition 
that contains a denunciation of alleged violations of the human rights set 
forth in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,” spe-
cifically in relation to OAS States not a party to the Convention.93 The 
jurisdiction of the Commission to examine petitions against such States 
is no longer seriously questioned. 
The next step, then, is finding the link between the Convention rights 
cited in Advisory Opinion 23, and the American Declaration, on which 
any petition against Canada must be based. This is a weaker point than 
the first in this legal patchwork, but I argue that the right recognized in 
Advisory Opinion 23 can be found in Article XIII of the American Dec-
laration. 
First, by the Opinion’s own language, the right to a healthy environ-
ment can be read into Article 26 of the American Convention because it 
already exists in the OAS Charter and the American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man.94 Specifically, it cites Articles 30, 31, 33, and 
34 of the OAS Charter, which establishes the obligation of States to 
achieve the integral development of their peoples.95 Integral develop-
ments means the promotion of sustainable development, which has an 
environmental dimension.96 The American Declaration, in turn, “contains 
and defines those human rights essential to which the Charter refers.”97 
Thus, since the Convention derives its meaning from these two underly-
ing documents, non-parties to the Convention can still be held to the ob-
ligations set forth in the Advisory Opinion by virtue of their ratification 
of the OAS Charter rather than based on the Convention. 
 
 92. Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, O.A.S. Off. Rec. 
OEA/Ser.P/IX.0.2/80, vol. 1 at 88 (1979), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human 
Rights in the Inter-American System, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82, doc.6 rev.1, at 
93 (1992), available at http://www.hrlibrary.umn.edu/oasinstr/zoas4cms.htm. 
 93. Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, reprinted in Basic Doc-
uments Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82, doc.6 rev.1, 
at 103 (1992), available at http://www.hrlibrary.umn.edu/oasinstr/zoas5cmr.htm. 
 94. Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 88, ¶ 57. 
 95. Id. at 26 n.85. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. ¶ 57. 
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Second, previous determinations of the Commission support this 
reading. Although the relationship between the environment and human 
rights has not previously been the subject of an Advisory Opinion issued 
by the Inter-American Court, the relationship has been addressed by the 
Commission.  
In fact, allegations of the destruction of the environment and natural 
resources have been lodged against Canada in the past.98 The 
Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group alleged that starting in the 19th century their 
lands were transferred by force to third parties without consultation or 
compensation.99 While the petitioners continued to hunt, fish, and gather 
food on their ancestral lands, increased concessions to third parties in 
light of the 2010 Winter Olympics and subsequent felling of forests and 
other environmental damage severely impeded their ability to pursue 
these activities.100 These activities are essential to preserving their culture 
and way of life.101 On these facts, the Commission found that the destruc-
tion of the environment and natural resources, and its impact on the 
Hul’qumi’num culture and way of life, characterized violations of Article 
XIII of the American Declaration, which protects the right to the benefits 
of culture.102 Thus, the obligation to protect the environment, as outlined 
by Advisory Opinion 23, codified the pre-existing obligations of OAS 
States that are non-parties to the Convention.103 
Canada has an obligation to protect the environment in terms of eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights on the basis of the OAS Charter and the 
Declaration. The mechanisms for accountability are more limited under 
the Declaration than under the Convention, a symptom of powerful 
States’ ability to circumvent international responsibility. Nonetheless, 
this obligation exists and the increased attention to this issue is a promis-
ing step forward in addressing abuses that might arise from mine closures 
abroad.  
 
 98. Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 105/09, Petition 592-07, Hul’qumi’num Treaty 
Group v. Canada, (Oct. 30, 2009). 
 99. Id. ¶ 10. 
 100. Id. ¶ 11. 
 101. Id. ¶ 12. 
 102. Id. ¶ 53. 
 103. The Commission itself has signaled the importance of the intersection between the envi-
ronment and economic, social and cultural rights, by creating in 2017 (prior to the Opinion) the 
position of Special Rapporteur on Economic, Social, Cultural, and Environmental Rights. IACHR 
Chooses Soledad García Muñoz as Special Rapporteur on Economic, Social, Cultural, and Envi-
ronmental Rights (ESCER), ORG. OF AM. STATES (July 5, 2017), https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/me-
dia_center/PReleases/2017/090.asp. 
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B.  Extraterritorial Application 
Applying this obligation in the Marlin context, and likely many oth-
ers, creates another two-step analysis: (1) whether the obligations of OAS 
non-parties to the Convention applies extraterritorially; and (2) if so, 
whether this obligation still applies in the case of third parties operating 
abroad, rather than operations of the State itself. 
Again, the first question is easier to answer. In the Advisory Opin-
ion, the Court notes that jurisdiction is not limited to acts carried out 
within the territory of the State in question.104 The Court cites a number 
of admissible cases where the respondent State has carried out military 
operations outside its territory.105 In particular, it cites two cases that 
came before the Commission in which the U.S. was the respondent 
State:106 Caso Coard, dealing with U.S. military intervention in Gre-
nada;107 and Salas, dealing with U.S. military intervention in Panama.108 
Neither report addresses extraterritorial application directly, but the Com-
mission in Coard, for example, roundly rejects the U.S. assertion that 
U.S. military action in Grenada is not subject to the Commission’s exam-
ination, concluding that the facts characterize a violation of a human right 
and thus provided a basis for admissibility.109 This reading of jurisdiction 
represents a crack in the human rights system that, at times, protects abus-
ers on the basis of jurisdiction.110 
The inclusion of these two cases in the Advisory Opinion also sug-
gests that the Opinion’s conclusions on extraterritoriality implicate non-
parties to the Convention. The Salas merits report, issued after the Opin-
ion, makes this explicit. The report explained that in assessing the scope 
of the Declaration, the Commission must ascertain “whether there is a 
 
 104. Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 88, ¶ 78. 
 105. Id. ¶ 79. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Coard, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 14/94 at 1. 
 108. Salas v. United States, Case 10.573, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 31/93, 
OEA/Ser.L./V/I.85, doc. 9 (1993). 
 109. Coard, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 14/94 at 11. 
 110. The U.S. position on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) for 
example, is that its requirement that States protect the rights of “all individuals within its territory 
and subject to its jurisdiction,” should be read conjunctively – that is, an individual must be both 
within U.S. territory and subject to its jurisdiction in order for an obligation to arise. Memorandum 
Opinion on the Geographic Scope of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.S. 
Dep’t of State, Off. of the Legal Adviser (Oct. 19, 2010). This is despite clear guidance from the 
Human Rights Committee that the clause should be read disjunctively. Hum. Rts. Comm., General 
Comment No. 31, U.N. Doc.CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004); Beth Van Schaack, The 
United States’ Position on the Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Obligations: Now is 
the Time for Change, 90 INT’L L. STUD. 20 (2014). 
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causal connection between the extraterritorial conduct of a state through 
the actions or omissions of its agents . . . and the alleged violation of the 
right . . . .”111Although the Commission does not directly cite the Opin-
ion, it uses much of the same language from the Opinion. Such use avoids 
the question of the direct applicability of the Court’s Advisory Opinion 
on the Commission, but effectively sets forth a parallel standard for non-
party States.112 
Both Coard and Salas concerned military activities, but in the Opin-
ion the Court clarifies that military situations are not the only instances 
where extraterritorial jurisdiction may apply.113 This issue leads into the 
second question – whether home States are responsible for acts of their 
non-State actors. Although the Opinion was ground-breaking in setting 
forth the inclusion of environmental rights that are protected by the Inter-
American system, the Court takes a quieter but equally significant step 
forward in discussing extraterritoriality. It broadens the concept of extra-
territoriality, concluding that a State is responsible for activities carried 
out outside its territory if the State “exercises a[n] effective control over 
the activities.”114 Thus, it establishes a causality requirement between an 
act or omission of the State and the human rights violation.115 Again, this 
is almost precisely the language used by the Commission in the Salas 
merit report,116 indicating that this standard is applicable to non-party 
States. 
 
 111. Sala Galindo v. United States, Case 10.573, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 121/18, 
OEA/Ser. L/V/II.169, doc. 138 ¶ 314 (2019). In a 2020 report on a case involving extradition to the 
U.S., the Commission again stated that “States have the duty to respect the rights of all persons 
within its territory and of those present in the territory of another State but subject to the control of 
its agent. . . [I]t is necessary to determine whether there is a causal nexus between the extraterritorial 
conduct of a State through the acts or omissions of its agents and/or of persons who have acted 
under its command or acquiescence, and the alleged violation of the rights and freedoms of a per-
son.” Nelson Ivan Serrano Saenz v. United States, Case 13.356, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report 
No. 200/20, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, doc. 214 at 48 (2020) (finding that Ecuadorian officers who arrested 
the petitioner were acting as U.S. agents because a U.S. special agent present in Ecuador in his 
official capacity orchestrated the arrest). The Commission had previously addressed the extraterri-
torial application of the Declaration, requiring victims be subject to the control of the other state 
through the acts of its agents. Djamel Ameziane v. United States, Petition Judgment, Inter-Am. 
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 17/12, ¶ 30 (2012). 
 112. The Commission’s hesitance to pronounce the Advisory Opinions directly applicable to 
non-party States is understandable – it avoids protests of non-parties to being held responsible to a 
Convention they never signed, while at the same time properly developing a strong parallel juris-
prudence based on the Declaration. 
 113. Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 88, ¶¶ 79-80. 
 114. Id. ¶ 104(h). 
 115. Id. ¶ 103. 
 116. See Galindo, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 121/18, ¶ 314. 
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The Opinion is broad in its description of the causality test,117 but it 
does contemplate a situation in which the actions or omissions of a State 
in relation to a MNC incorporated in that State are causally connected to 
a human rights violation abroad.118 The Court refers to such a situation 
when it notes that States have the obligation to prevent human rights vi-
olations by private third-parties.119 This responsibility could stem from a 
State failing to regulate, supervise, or investigate such actors.120 In terms 
of regulation, the Court considers that States must regulate activities that 
might cause “significant damage” to the environment.121 Specifically, it 
cites the “positive tendency” in international human rights law to protect 
human rights in situations of MNCs operating abroad.122 The Court’s pro-
nouncements on the issue are a positive development, although one that 
is yet to be clearly defined.123 
The missing link here, then, is whether the piece relating to third 
parties will be applicable to non-party States on the basis of the Declara-
tion. The Salas merits report did not have an occasion to address this is-
sue, as the basis of the allegations was military activity. The Commission 
addressed this issue in its 2015 report on the extractive sector and indig-
enous and afro-descendant peoples, recognizing the increasing pressure 
to hold origin countries accountable, without pronouncing on the issue.124 
In 2019, the Commission signaled more pointedly that such extra-
territorial jurisdiction may exist based on the Declaration. In its report on 
business and human rights, it replicated the language of regulation, su-
pervision, and investigation used in the Opinion, noting that this act or 
omission can be analyzed on the basis of the general obligation to protect 
 
 117. Antal Berkes, A New Extraterritorial Jurisdictional Link Recognised by the IACtHR, 
EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/a-new-extraterritorial-jurisdictional-link-
recognised-by-the-iacthr/. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 88, ¶ 118. 
 120. Id. ¶ 119. 
 121. Id. ¶ 149. 
 122. Id. ¶ 151. 
 123. Berkes, supra note 117. 
 124. Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Indigenous Peoples, Afro-Descendent Communities, and Natu-
ral Resources: Human Rights Protection in the Context of Extraction, Exploitation, and Develop-
ment Activities, OEA/Ser.L/V/II., doc. 47/15 ¶ 80 (Dec. 31, 2015). The Commission addressed the 
issue again in 2017 in a report on Poverty and Human Rights, noting that a state must protect against 
human rights abuses carried out “‘within their territory and/or jurisdiction by third parties, includ-
ing business enterprises.’” Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report on Poverty and Human Rights in the 
Americas, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.164, doc. 147, at 248 (Sept. 7, 2017), citing Case of the Kaliña y Lokono 
Peoples v. Suriname, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 
309, ¶ 248 (Nov. 25, 2015). 
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human rights as outlined in the Convention “and other applicable Inter-
American instruments.”125 Ultimately, the report does not dwell much on 
the issue of parties who have not ratified the Convention and their respon-
sibility vis-à-vis MNCs operating abroad. Yet, through these reports the 
Commission has signaled its openness to this kind of extraterritorial ap-
plication of human rights obligations. Again, these advances indicate 
cracks in the walls of international human rights law as it was established. 
In these Parts, I’ve set forth the links within the Inter-American sys-
tem that would recognize Canada’s responsibility for the environmental 
harm resulting from the closure of the Marlin Mine. Specifically, a par-
allel to the environmental rights set forth in the Advisory Opinion can 
likely be found in the American Declaration, and therefore the Commis-
sion is empowered to examine petitions against non-parties to the Con-
vention on that basis. Further, the fact that the harm has occurred abroad 
as a result of the activities of a third party is not an obstacle. 
VI.  WHAT THIS MEANS FOR CANADA  
This exploration of universal and regional human rights law indi-
cates that Canada likely has a responsibility to regulate, supervise, and 
investigate corporations responsible for abuses during mine closures 
abroad. The ICESCR requirements that States exercise human rights dil-
igence, hold corporations liable for violations of ESC rights, and provide 
remedies to victims track closely with the Inter-American Commission 
for Human Rights requirements.  
This responsibility would require Canada to adopt a framework gov-
erning mine closures abroad. Although for Marlin the time has passed for 
initial diligence, for future mine sites, this responsibility may mean de-
veloping a regulatory framework that requires companies to provide de-
tailed closure plans during the early stages of development that are re-
sponsive to environmental and social risks specific to the community in 
which the mine will operate. For example, the Initiative for Responsible 
Mining Assurance proposes standards for closure plans that include the 
role of affected communities in reviewing the plan, the disposal of haz-
ardous materials, long-term maintenance and monitoring, and a detailed 
determination of the costs of closure.126 The responsibility to regulate and 
supervise would require monitoring Canadian corporations for 
 
 125. Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Informe Empresas y Derechos Humanos: Estándares 
Interamericanos, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, CIDH/REDESCA/INF.1/19 ¶ 153 (Nov. 1, 2019). 
 126. INITIATIVE FOR RESPONSIBLE MINING ASSURANCE, IRMA STANDARD FOR RESPONSIBLE 
MINING IRMA-STD-001 70-71 (2018). 
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compliance with these regulations in their mine closure operations. Here, 
although the nexus requirement for finding origin State responsibility is 
broad, as described by the Economic and Social Council,127 with time the 
Court128 and the Commission129 will have more opportunities to address 
this issue, and this area of law will continue to grow. Considering the 
trajectory so far, Canada would do well to assume that further develop-
ment on the nexus requirement will not significantly narrow instances of 
responsibility.  
In relation to the responsibility of investigating and bringing corpo-
rations to justice, a judicial or administrative mechanism for holding cor-
porations liable for damage resulting from improper closure will likely 
be required, in addition to providing remedies for victims of these viola-
tions. Communities and advocates have certainly attempted to pursue 
remedies in Canadian and U.S. courts for the abuses of mining corpora-
tions incorporated in those States.130 The Supreme Court of Canada emit-
ted a decision in 2020 in a case concerning Nevsun Resources, in which 
there were allegations that Nevsun’s agents perpetrated atrocities, includ-
ing slavery, in its operations in Eritrea.131 The Supreme Court of Canada 
held that Nevsun could be sued in Canada, since customary international 
law is part of Canadian law and it is not “plain and obvious” that the 
Eritrean workers’ claims could not succeed.132 This was not a decision on 
the merits of the case, and considering the barriers to accessing this kind 
of justice, new legislation would likely be needed for Canada to fulfill its 
 
 127. E/C.12/GC/24, supra note 76, ¶ 28. 
 128. See Berkes, supra note 117. 
 129. See Informe Empresas y Derechos Humanos: Estándares Interamericanos, supra note 125, 
¶ 152. 
 130. In the U.S., a case against Newmont Mining Corporation alleging that its agents violently 
dispossessed inhabitants of land acquired by the company for gold exploration is moving its way 
through the judiciary. Acuna-Atalaya v. Newmont Mining Corp., No. CV 17-1315, 2020 WL 
1154783 at *1 (D. Del. Mar. 10, 2020). The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision 
granting Newmont’s motion to dismiss on the basis that Peru is the more appropriate forum. Id. at 
*13; Acuna-Atalaya v. Newmont Mining Corp., No. 20-1765 (3d Cir. Dec. 11, 2020). 
 131. Nevsun Resources Ltd. v. Araya [2020], 5 S.C.R. (Can.). 
 132. Id. ¶ 132. [M]odern international human rights law [is] the phoenix that rose from the 
ashes of World War II and declared global war on human rights abuses. Its mandate was to prevent 
breaches of internationally accepted norms. Those norms were not meant to be theoretical aspira-
tions or legal luxuries, but moral imperatives and legal necessities. Conduct that undermined the 
norms was to be identified and addressed. Id. ¶ 1. This is not the first time individuals harmed by 
Canadian mining companies abroad have sought remedy in Canada. See Chilenye Nwapi, Resource 
Extraction in the Courtroom: The Significance of Choc v Hudbay Minerals Inc for Transnational 
Justice in Canada, 14 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 121, 150 (2014) (“Hudbay is significant 
in at least three respects: (1) its jurisdictional use of the direct liability theory; (2) its attempt to 
enunciate a novel duty of care; and (3) good lawyering”). 
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human rights responsibility of providing a remedy to victims of human 
rights violations as a result of mine closures.133  
The developments in international human rights law outlined here 
indicate Canada has the responsibility to develop robust legislation regu-
lating mine closures, enforce these regulations, and create effective ave-
nues for victims’ pursuit of remedies. This process will help remove the 
deception of global equality and provide justice for those previously writ-
ten out of human rights protections. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Mine closure is by no means the end. Rather, it is an epilogue that 
desperately needs to be told. The Marlin Mine is an emblematic example 
of the problems in regulating and providing accountability for the opera-
tions of MNCs that close mines abroad. In the preceding parts, I outline 
the developments within the universal human rights system, showing that 
the ICESCR likely requires States to put in place frameworks that can 
hold MNCs liable for damage resulting from mine closures, and provide 
remedies to victims. Next, I explore a similar progression within the In-
ter-American system, connecting the dots between environmental rights, 
the responsibilities of OAS States that have not signed the American Con-
vention, and the extraterritorial applicability of these obligations to pri-
vate actors. These are powerful steps forward, but they are by no means 
enough.  
Although I argue that space has opened in the Inter-American and 
universal systems for the kind of accountability needed in the Marlin con-
text and others similar to it, the patchwork required to reach this point is 
indicative of the ways that international law has built-in protections for 
powerful States in the Global North that are complicit in the abuses 
against communities in the Global South. Enforcement of human rights 
 
 133. There are three mechanisms within Canada for accountability for human rights violations 
abroad, aside from civil litigation like Nevsun and the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act. 
They are the Canadian Corporate Social Responsibility Framework (now defunct), the National 
Contact Point, and the Canadian Ombudsperson for Responsible Enterprise (CORE) announced in 
2018. JUSTICE AND CORP. ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, RESPONSIBILITY OF CANADA FOR 
ACTIONS OF CANADIAN COMPANIES IN LATIN AMERICA (2018). In the Marlin context, petitioners 
attempted to address the Canadian National Contact Point pursuant to the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises. Frente de Defensa San Miguelense, supra note 4, at 4 (The contact point 
in its final statement recommended the parties engage in dialogue and closed the instance). 
CANADIAN NATIONAL CONTACT POINT FOR THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL 
ENTERPRISES FINAL STATEMENT OF THE CANADIAN NATIONAL CONTACT POINT ON THE 
NOTIFICATION DATED DECEMBER 9, 2009, CONCERNING THE MARLIN MINE IN GUATEMALA, 
PURSUANT TO THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (May 3, 2011). 
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law is difficult, since ultimately the responsibility is with States to honor 
their human rights obligations.134 For example, the problem of extraterri-
torial application persists, in part because powerful States can otherwise 
rely on borders, a “technolog[y] of racialized exclusion,”135 to insulate 
themselves from accountability for these abuses. A human rights frame-
work focused on the State, rather than non-State actors such as MNCs 
and the home States that enable their activity, impedes accountability by 
obscuring inequalities. This means that companies, with the indirect and 
sometimes direct support of their origin States, can carry out racialized 
human rights abuses with few avenues for accountability. Nevertheless, 
the fact that the universal and Inter-American systems have expanded 
possibilities for environmental protection and the extraterritorial applica-
tion of human rights laws are rays of light in the open pit of international 
human rights law.  
 
 
 134. For this reason, other forums, such as international criminal law, should be explored. See 
Christopher St. Martin, Criminalize It: A Proper Means of Addressing Environmental Abuses Per-
petrated by Multinational Corporations in the Extractive Industry, 28 GEO. ENV’TL. L. REV. 107, 
128 (2015). 
 135. See, e.g., Tendai Achiume, Migration as Decolonization, 71 STAN. L. REV 1509, 1530-31 
(2019) (“[B]ecause of the persisting racial demographics that distinguish the First World from the 
Third—demographics that are, in significant part, a product of passports, national borders, and 
other successful institutions that partially originated as technologies of racialized exclusion — most 
whites enjoy dramatically greater rights to freedom of international movement (by which I mean 
travel across borders) than most nonwhites. The reality is that the mortal cost of international mo-
bility is largely a nonwhite problem”). 
